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Abstract. We study a market for private data in which a data ana-
lyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information.
Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy pro-
portional to the differential privacy guarantee given by the analyst at
the time of the release. The analyst incentivizes individuals by compen-
sating them, giving rise to a privacy auction. Motivated by recommender
systems, the statistic we consider is a linear predictor function with pub-
licly known weights. The statistic can be viewed as a prediction of the
unknown data of a new individual, based on the data of individuals
in the database. We formalize the trade-off between privacy and accu-
racy in this setting, and show that a simple class of estimates achieves
an order-optimal trade-off. It thus suffices to focus on auction mecha-
nisms that output such estimates. We use this observation to design a
truthful, individually rational, proportional-purchase mechanism under
a fixed budget constraint. We show that our mechanism is 5-approximate
in terms of accuracy compared to the optimal mechanism, and that no
truthful mechanism can achieve a 2− ε approximation, for any ε > 0.
1 Introduction
Recommender systems are ubiquitous on the Internet, lying at the heart of
some of the most popular Internet services, including Netflix, Yahoo, and Ama-
zon. These systems use algorithms to predict, e.g., a user’s rating for a movie,
her propensity to click on an advertisement or to purchase a product online.
By design, such prediction algorithms rely on access to large training datasets,
typically comprising data from thousands (often millions) of individuals. This
large-scale collection of user data has raised serious privacy concerns among re-
searchers and consumer advocacy groups. Privacy researchers have shown that
access to seemingly non-sensitive data (e.g., movie ratings) can lead to the leak-
age of potentially sensitive information when combined with de-anonymization
techniques [1]. Moreover, a spate of recent lawsuits [2,3,4] as well as behavioral
studies [5] have demonstrated the increasing reluctance of the public to allow
the unfettered collection and monetization of user data.
As a result, researchers and advocacy groups have argued in favor of legisla-
tion protecting individuals, by ensuring they can “opt-out” from data collection
if they so desire [6]. However, a widespread restriction on data collection would
be detrimental to profits of the above companies. One way to address this tension
between the value of data and the users’ need for privacy is through incentiviza-
tion. In short, companies releasing an individual’s data ought to appropriately
compensate her for the violation of her privacy, thereby incentivizing her consent
to the release.
We study the issue of user incentivization through privacy auctions, as in-
troduced by Ghosh and Roth [7]. In a privacy auction, a data analyst has access
to a database d ∈ Rn of private data di, i = 1, . . . , n, each corresponding to a
different individual. This data may represent information that is to be protected,
such as an individual’s propensity to click on an ad or purchase a product, or the
number of visits to a particular website. The analyst wishes to publicly release
an estimate sˆ(d) of a statistic s(d) evaluated over the database. In addition,
each individual incurs a privacy cost ci upon the release of the estimate sˆ(d),
and must be appropriately compensated by the analyst for this loss of utility.
The analyst has a budget, which limits the total compensation paid out. As such,
given a budget and a statistic s, the analyst must (a) solicit the costs of indi-
viduals ci and (b) determine the estimate sˆ to release as well as the appropriate
compensation to each individual.
Ghosh and Roth employ differential privacy [8] as a principled approach to
quantifying the privacy cost ci. Informally, ensuring that sˆ(d) is ǫ-differentially
private with respect to individual i provides a guarantee on the privacy of this
individual; a small ǫ corresponds to better privacy since it guarantees that sˆ(d) is
essentially independent of the individual’s data di. Privacy auctions incorporate
this notion by assuming that each individual i incurs a cost ci = ci(ǫ), that is a
function of the privacy guarantee ǫ provided by the analyst.
1.1 Our Contribution
Motivated by recommender systems, we focus in this paper on a scenario where
the statistic s takes the form of a linear predictor :
s(d) := 〈w,d〉 =
∑n
i=1 widi, (1)
where w ∈ Rn, is a publicly known vector of real (possibly negative) weights.
Intuitively, the public weights wi serve as measures of the similarity between
each individual i and a new individual, outside the database. The function s(d)
can then be interpreted as a prediction of the value d for this new individual.
Linear predictors of the form (1) include many well-studied methods of sta-
tistical inference, such as the k-nearest-neighbor method, the Nadaranya-Watson
weighted average, ridge regression, as well as support vector machines. We pro-
vide a brief review of such methods in Section 5. Functions of the form (1) are
thus of particular interest in the context of recommender systems [9,10], as well
as other applications involving predictions (e.g., polling/surveys, marketing). In
the sequel, we ignore the provenance of the public weights w, keeping in mind
that any of these methods apply. Our contributions are as follows:
1. Privacy-Accuracy Trade-off. We characterize the accuracy of the esti-
mate sˆ in terms of the distortion between the linear predictor s and sˆ defined
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as δ(s, sˆ) := maxd E
[
|s(d)− sˆ(d)|2
]
, i.e., the maximum mean square error
between s(d) and sˆ(d) over all databases d. We define a privacy index β(sˆ)
that captures the amount of privacy an estimator sˆ provides to individuals
in the database. We show that any estimator sˆ with low distortion must also
have a low privacy index (Theorem 1).
2. Laplace Estimators Suffice. We show that a special class of Laplace es-
timators [8,11] (i.e., estimators that use noise drawn from a Laplace dis-
tribution), which we call Discrete Canonical Laplace Estimator Functions
(DCLEFs), exhibits an order-optimal trade-off between privacy and distor-
tion (Theorem 2). This allows us to restrict our focus on privacy auctions
that output DCLEFs as estimators of the linear predictor s.
3. Truthful, 5-approximate Mechanism, and Lower bound.We design a
truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible mechanism that outputs a
DCLEF as an estimator of the linear predictor (Theorem 3). Our estimator’s
accuracy is a 5-approximation with respect to the DCLEF output by an
optimal, individually rational, budget feasible mechanism. We also prove
a lower bound (Theorem 4): there is no truthful DCLEF mechanism that
achieves an approximation ratio 2− ε, for any ε > 0.
In our analysis, we exploit the fact that when sˆ is a Laplace estimator mini-
mizing distortion under a budget resembles the knapsack problem. As a result,
the problem of designing a privacy auction that outputs a DCLEF sˆ is similar
in spirit to the knapsack auction mechanism [12]. However, our setting poses
an additional challenge because the privacy costs exhibit externalities : the cost
incurred by an individual is a function of which other individuals are being com-
pensated. Despite the externalities in costs, we achieve the same approximation
as the one known for the knapsack auction mechanism [12].
1.2 Related Work
Privacy of behavioral data. Differentially-private algorithms have been de-
veloped for the release of several different kinds of online user behavioral data
such as click-through rates and search-query frequencies [13], as well as movie
ratings [14]. As pointed out by McSherry and Mironov [14], the reason why the
release of such data constitutes a privacy violation is not necessarily that, e.g.,
individuals perceive it as embarrassing, but that it renders them susceptible to
linkage and de-anonymization attacks [1]. Such linkages could allow, for example,
an attacker to piece together an individual’s address stored in one database with
his credit card number or social security number stored in another database. It
is therefore natural to attribute a loss of utility to the disclosure of such data.
Privacy auctions. Quantifying the cost of privacy loss allows one to study
privacy in the context of an economic transaction. Ghosh and Roth initiate this
study of privacy auctions in the setting where the data is binary and the statistic
reported is the sum of bits, i.e., di ∈ {0, 1} and wi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n [7].
Unfortunately, the Ghosh-Roth auction mechanism cannot be readily general-
ized to asymmetric statistics such as (1), which, as discussed in Section 5, have
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numerous important applications including recommender systems. Our Theo-
rems 1 and 2, which parallel the characterization of order-optimal estimators
in [7], imply that to produce an accurate estimate of s, the estimator sˆ must
provide different privacy guarantees to different individuals. This is in contrast
to the multi-unit procurement auction of [7]. In fact, as discussed the introduc-
tion, a privacy auction outputting a DCLEF sˆ(d) has many similarities with a
knapsack auction mechanism [12], with the additional challenge of externalities
introduced by the Laplacian noise (see also Section 4).
Privacy and truthfulness in mechanism design. A series of interesting
results follow an orthogonal direction, namely, on the connection between pri-
vacy and truthfulness when individuals have the ability to misreport their data.
Starting with the work of McSherry and Talwar [15] followed by Nissim et al [16],
Xiao [17] and most recently Chen et al [18], these papers design mechanisms that
are simultaneously truthful and privacy-preserving (using differential privacy or
other closely related definitions of privacy). As pointed out by Xiao [17], all
these papers consider an unverified database, i.e., the mechanism designer can-
not verify the data reported by individuals and therefore must incentivize them
to report truthfully. Recent work on truthfully eliciting private data through a
survey [19,20] also fall under the unverified database setting [17]. In contrast,
our setting, as well as that of Ghosh and Roth, is that of a verified database,
in which individuals cannot lie about their data. This setting is particularly rel-
evant to the context of online behavioral data: information on clicks, websites
visited and products purchased is collected and stored in real-time and cannot
be retracted after the fact.
Correlation between privacy costs and data values. An implicit as-
sumption in privacy auctions as introduced in [7] is that the privacy costs ci are
not correlated with the data values di. This might not be true if, e.g., the data
represents the propensity of an individual to contract a disease. Ghosh and Roth
[7] show that when the privacy costs are correlated to the data no individually
rational direct revelation mechanism can simultaneously achieve non-trivial ac-
curacy and differential privacy. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the
privacy cost of the release of behavioral data is predominantly due to the risk
of a linkage attack. It is reasonable in many cases to assume that this risk (and
hence the cost of privacy loss) is not correlated to, e.g., the user’s movie ratings.
Nevertheless, due to its importance in other settings such as medical data, more
recent privacy auction models aim at handling such correlation [19,20,21]; we
leave generalizing our results to such privacy auction models as future work.
2 Preliminaries
Let [k] = {1, · · · , k}, for any integer k > 0, and define I := [Rmin, Rmax] ⊂ R to
be a bounded real interval. Consider a database containing the information of
n > 0 individuals. In particular, the database comprises a vector d, whose entries
di ∈ I, i ∈ [n], represent the private information of individual i. Each entry
di is a priori known to the database administrator, and therefore individuals
4
do not have the ability to lie about their private data. A data analyst with
access to the database would like to publicly release an estimate of the statistic
s(d) of the form (1), i.e. s(d) =
∑
i∈[n] widi, for some publicly known weight
vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ R
n. For any subset H ⊆ [n], we define w(H) :=∑
i∈H |wi|, and denote by W := w([n]) =
∑n
i=1 |wi| the ℓ1 norm of vector w.
We denote the length of interval I by ∆ := Rmax − Rmin, and its midpoint by
R¯ := (Rmin + Rmax)/2. Without loss of generality, we assume that wi 6= 0 for
all i ∈ [n]; if not, since entries for which wi = 0 do not contribute to the linear
predictor, it suffices to consider the entries of d for which wi 6= 0.
2.1 Differential Privacy and Distortion
Similar to [7], we use the following generalized definition of differential privacy:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A (randomized) function f : In → Rm
is (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private if for each individual i ∈ [n] and for any pair
of data vectors d,d(i) ∈ In differing in only their i-th entry, ǫi is the smallest
value such that P[f(d) ∈ S] ≤ eǫiP[f(d(i)) ∈ S] for all S ⊂ Rm.
This definition differs slightly from the usual definition of ǫ-differential pri-
vacy [11], as the latter is stated in terms of the worst case privacy across all
individuals. More specifically, according to the notation in [11], an (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-
differentially private function is ǫ-differentially private, where ǫ = maxi ǫi.
Given a deterministic function f , a well-knownmethod to provide ǫ-differential
privacy is to add random noise drawn from a Laplace distribution to this function
[11]. This readily extends to (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differential privacy.
Lemma 1 ([11]) Consider a deterministic function f : In → R. Define fˆ(d) :=
f(d) + Lap(σ), where Lap(σ) is a random variable sampled from the Laplace
distribution with parameter σ. Then, fˆ is (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private, where
ǫi = Si(f)/σ, and Si(f) := maxd,d(i)∈In |f(d) − f(d(i))|, is the sensitivity of f
to the i-th entry di, i ∈ [n].
Intuitively, the higher the variance σ of the Laplace noise added to f , the smaller
ǫi, and hence, the better the privacy guarantee of fˆ . Moreover, for a fixed σ, en-
tries i with higher sensitivity Si(f) receive a worse privacy guarantee (higher ǫi).
There is a natural tradeoff between the amount of noise added and the ac-
curacy of the perturbed function fˆ . To capture this, we introduce the notion of
distortion between two (possibly randomized) functions:
Definition 2 (Distortion). Given two functions f : In → R and fˆ : In → R,
the distortion, δ(f, fˆ), between f and fˆ is given by
δ(f, fˆ) := max
d∈In
E
[
|f(d)− fˆ(d)|2
]
.
In our setup, the data analyst wishes to disclose an estimator function sˆ :
In → R of the linear predictor s. Intuitively, a good estimator sˆ should have a
small distortion δ(s, sˆ), while also providing good differential privacy guarantees.
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2.2 Privacy Auction Mechanisms
Each individual i ∈ [n] has an associated cost function ci : R+ → R+, which
determines the cost ci(ǫi) incurred by i when an (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private
estimate sˆ is released by the analyst. As in [7], we consider linear cost functions,
i.e., ci(ǫ) = viǫ, for all i ∈ [n]. We refer to vi as the unit-cost of individual i.
The unit-costs vi are not a priori known to the data analyst. Without loss of
generality, we assume throughout the paper that v1 ≤ . . . ≤ vn.
Given a weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn, let Ms be a mechanism
compensating individuals in [n] for their loss of privacy from the release of an
estimate sˆ of the linear predictor s(d). Formally, Ms takes as input a vector of
reported unit-costs v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ R
n
+ and a budget B, and outputs
1. a payment pi ∈ R+ for every i ∈ [n], and
2. an estimator function sˆ : In → R+.
Assume that the estimator sˆ satisfies (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differential privacy. A mech-
anism is budget feasible if
∑
i∈[n] pi ≤ B, i.e., the payments made by the mech-
anism are within the budget B. Moreover, a mechanism is individually rational
if for all i ∈ [n], pi ≥ ci(ǫi) = viǫi, i.e., payments made by the mechanism
exceed the cost incurred by individuals. Finally, a mechanism is truthful if for all
i ∈ [n], pi(vi, v−i) − viǫi(vi, v−i) ≥ pi(v′i, v−i) − viǫi(v
′
i, v−i), i.e., no individual
can improve her utility by misreporting her private unit-cost.
2.3 Outline of our approach
We denote by δMs := δ(s, sˆ) the distortion between s and the function output by
the mechanism Ms. Ideally, a mechanism should output an estimator that has
small distortion. However, the smaller the distortion, the higher the privacy vio-
lation and, hence, the more money the mechanism needs to spend. As such, the
objective of this paper is to design a mechanism with minimal distortion, subject
to the constraints of truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility.
To address this question, in Section 3, we first establish a privacy-distortion
tradeoff for differentially-private estimators of the linear predictor. We then in-
troduce a family of estimators, Discrete Canonical Laplace Estimator Functions
(DCLEFs), and show that they achieve a near-optimal privacy-distortion trade-
off. This result allows us to limit our attention to DCLEF privacy auction mech-
anisms, i.e., mechanisms that output a DCLEF sˆ. In Section 4, we present a
mechanism that is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible, while also
being near-optimal in terms of distortion.
3 Privacy-Distortion Tradeoff and Laplace Estimators
Recall that a good estimator should exhibit low distortion and simultaneously
give good privacy guarantees. In this section, we establish the privacy-distortion
tradeoff for differentially-private estimators of the linear predictor. Moreover,
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we introduce a family of estimators that exhibits a near-optimal tradeoff be-
tween privacy and distortion. This will motivate our focus on privacy auction
mechanisms that output estimators from this class in Section 4.
3.1 Privacy-Distortion Tradeoff
There exists a natural tension between privacy and distortion, as highlighted by
the following two examples.
Example 1. Consider the estimator sˆ := R¯
∑n
i=1 wi, where recall that R¯ =
(Rmin+Rmax)/2. This estimator guarantees perfect privacy (i.e., ǫi = 0), for all
individuals. However, δ(s, sˆ) = (W∆)2/4.
Example 2. Consider the estimator function sˆ :=
∑n
i=1 widi. In this case,
δ(s, sˆ) = 0. However, ǫi =∞ for all i ∈ [n].
In order to formalize this tension between privacy and distortion, we define
the privacy index of an estimator as follows.
Definition 3 Let sˆ : In → R be any (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private estimator
function for the linear predictor. We define the privacy index, β(sˆ), of sˆ as
β(sˆ) := max
{
w(H) : H ⊆ [n] and
∑
i∈H
ǫi < 1/2
}
. (2)
β(sˆ) captures the weight of the individuals that have been guaranteed good
privacy by sˆ. Next we characterize the impossibility of having an estimator with
a low distortion but a high privacy index. Note that for Example 1, β(sˆ) = W ,
i.e., the largest value possible, while for Example 2, β(sˆ) = 0. We stress that the
selection of 1/2 as an upper bound in (2) is arbitrary; Theorems 1 and 2 still
hold if another value is used, though the constants involved will differ.
Our first main result, which is proved in Appendix A, establishes a trade-off
between the privacy index and the distortion of an estimator.
Theorem 1 (Trade-off between Privacy-index and Distortion) Let 0 <
α < 1. Let sˆ : In → R be an arbitrary estimator function for the linear predictor.
If δ(s, sˆ) ≤ (αW∆)2/48 then β(sˆ) ≤ 2αW .
In other words, if an estimator has low distortion, the weight of individuals with
a good privacy guarantee (i.e., a small ǫi) can be at most an α fraction of 2W .
3.2 Laplace Estimator Functions
Consider the following family of estimators for the linear predictor sˆ : In → R:
sˆ(d; a,x, σ) :=
n∑
i=1
widixi +
n∑
i=1
wiai(1− xi) + Lap(σ) (3)
where xi ∈ [0, 1], and each ai ∈ R is a constant independent of the data vector
d. This function family is parameterized by x, a and σ. The estimator sˆ results
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from distorting s in two ways: (a) a randomized distortion by the addition of
the Laplace noise, and (b) a deterministic distortion through a linear interpola-
tion between each entry di and some constant ai. Intuitively, the interpolation
parameter xi determines the extent to which the estimate sˆ depends on entry
di. Using Lemma 1 and the definition of distortion, it is easy to characterize the
privacy and distortion properties of such estimators.
Lemma 2 Given wi, i ∈ [n], let s(d) be the linear predictor given by (1), and
sˆ an estimator of s given by (3). Then,
1. sˆ is (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private, where ǫi =
∆|wi| xi
σ , i ∈ [n].
2. The distortion satisfies δ(s, sˆ) ≥
(
∆
2
∑n
i=1 |wi|(1− xi)
)2
+2σ2, with equality
attained when ai = R¯, for all i ∈ [n].
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B. Note that the constants
ai do not affect the differential privacy properties of sˆ. Moreover, among all
estimators with given x, the distortion δ(s, sˆ) is minimized when ai = R¯ for all
i ∈ [n]. In other words, to minimize the distortion without affecting privacy, it is
always preferable to interpolate between di and R¯. This motivates us to define
the family of Laplace estimator functions as follows.
Definition 4 Given wi, i ∈ [n], the Laplace estimator function family (LEF)
for the linear predictor s is the set of functions sˆ : In → R, parameterized by x
and σ, such that
sˆ(d;x, σ) =
n∑
i=1
widixi + R¯
n∑
i=1
wi(1 − xi) + Lap(σ) (4)
We call a LEF discrete if xi ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, we call a LEF canonical
if the Laplace noise added to the estimator has a parameter of the form
σ = σ(x) := ∆
n∑
i=1
|wi|(1− xi) (5)
Recall that xi controls the dependence of sˆ on the entry di; thus, intuitively,
the standard deviation of the noise added in a canonical Laplace estimator is
proportional to the “residual weight” of data entries. Note that, by Lemma 2,
the distortion of a canonical Laplace estimator sˆ has the following simple form:
δ(s, sˆ) =
9
4
∆2
( n∑
i=1
|wi|(1− xi)
)2
=
9
4
∆2
(
W −
n∑
i=1
|wi|xi
)2
. (6)
Our next result establishes that there exists a discrete canonical Laplace
estimator function (DCLEF) with a small distortion and a high privacy index.
Theorem 2 (DCLEFs suffice) Let 0 < α < 1. Let
sˆ∗ := argmax
sˆ:δ(s,sˆ)≤(αW∆)2/48
β(sˆ)
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be an estimator with the highest privacy index among all sˆ for which δ(s, sˆ) ≤
(αW∆)2/48. There exists a DCLEF sˆ◦ : In → R such that δ(s, sˆ◦) ≤ (9/4)(αW∆)2,
and β(sˆ◦) ≥ 12β(sˆ
∗).
In other words, there exists a DCLEF that is within a constant factor, in terms of
both its distortion and its privacy index, from an optimal estimator sˆ∗. Theorem
2 is proved in Appendix C and has the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 1 Consider an arbitrary estimator sˆ with distortion δ(s, sˆ) < (W∆)2/48.
Then, there exists a DCLEF sˆ◦ such that δ(s, sˆ◦) ≤ 108δ(s, sˆ) and β(sˆ◦) ≥ 12β(sˆ).
Proof. Apply Theorem (2) with α =
√
48δ(s, sˆ)/(W∆). In particular, for this α
and sˆ as in the theorem statement, we have that sˆ∗ := argmaxsˆ′:δ(s,sˆ′)≤δ(s,sˆ) β(sˆ
′),
hence β(sˆ∗) ≥ β(sˆ). Therefore, there exists a DCLEF sˆ◦ such that δ(s, sˆ◦) ≤
(9/4)(αW∆)2 ≤ 108δ(s, sˆ), and β(sˆ◦) ≥ 12β(sˆ
∗) ≥ 12β(sˆ).
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that, when searching for estimators with low distortion
and high privacy index, it suffices (up to constant factors) to focus on DCLEFs.
Similar results were derived in [7] for estimators of unweighted sums of bits.
4 Privacy Auction Mechanism
Motivated by Theorems 1 and 2, we design a truthful, individually rational,
budget-feasible DCLEF mechanism (i.e., a mechanism that outputs a DCLEF)
and show that it is 5-approximate in terms of accuracy compared with the op-
timal, individually rational, budget-feasible DCLEF mechanism. Note that a
DCLEF is fully determined by the vector x ∈ {0, 1}n. Therefore, we will simply
refer to the output of the DCLEF mechanisms described below as (x,p), as the
latter characterize the released estimator and the compensations to individuals.
4.1 An Optimal DCLEF Mechanism
Consider the problem of designing a DCLEF mechanism M that is individu-
ally rational and budget feasible (but not necessarily truthful), and minimizes
δM . Given a DCLEF sˆ, define H(sˆ) := {i : xi = 1} to be the set of individ-
uals that receive non-zero differential privacy guarantees. Eq. (6) implies that
δ(s, sˆ) = 94∆
2(W − w(H(sˆ)))2. Thus, minimizing δ(s, sˆ) is equivalent to maxi-
mizing w(H(sˆ)). Let (xopt,popt) be an optimal solution to the following problem:
maximize S(x;w) =
n∑
i=1
|wi|xi
subject to: pi ≥ viǫi(x), ∀i ∈ [n], (individual rationality)
n∑
i=1
pi ≤ B (budget feasibility)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [n] (discrete estimator function)
(7)
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where, by Lemma 2 and (5),
ǫi(x) =
∆|wi|xi
σ(x)
=
|wi|xi∑
i |wi|(1− xi)
(canonical property). (8)
A mechanism Mopt that outputs (xopt,popt) will be an optimal, individually
rational, budget feasible (but not necessarily truthful) DCLEF mechanism. Let
OPT := S(xopt;w) be the optimal objective value of (7). We use OPT as the
benchmark to which we compare the (truthful) mechanism we design below.
Without loss of generality, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 For all i ∈ [n], |wi|vi/(W − |wi|) ≤ B.
Observe that if an individual i violates this assumption, then ci(ǫi(x)) > B for
any x output by a DCLEF mechanism that sets xi = 1. In other words, no
DCLEF mechanism (including Mopt) can compensate this individual within the
analyst’s budget and, hence, will set xi = 0. Therefore, it suffices to focus on the
subset of individuals for whom the assumption holds.
4.2 A Truthful DCLEF Mechanism
To highlight the challenge behind designing a truthful DCLEF mechanism, ob-
serve that if the privacy guarantees were given by ǫi(x) = xi rather than (8), the
optimization problem (7) would be identical to the budget-constrained mecha-
nism design problem for knapsack studied by Singer [12]. In the reverse-auction
setting of [12], an auctioneer purchases items valued at fixed costs vi by the
individuals that sell them. Each item i is worth |wi| to the auctioneer, while the
auctioneer’s budget is B. The goal of the auctioneer is to maximize the total
worth of the purchased set of items, i.e., S(x;w). Singer presents a truthful
mechanism that is 6-approximate with respect to OPT . However, in our set-
ting, the privacy guarantees ǫi(x) given by (8) introduce externalities into the
auction. In contrast to [12], the ǫi’s couple the cost incurred by an individual i
to the weight of other individuals that are compensated by the auction, mak-
ing the mechanism design problem harder. This difficulty is overcome by our
mechanism, which we call FairInnerProduct, described in Algorithm 1.
The mechanism takes as input the budget B, the weight vector w, and the
vector of unit-costs v, and outputs a set O ⊂ [n], that receive xi = 1 in the
DCLEF, as well as a set of payments for each individual in O. Our construction
uses a greedy approach similar to the Knapsack mechanism in [12]. In particular,
it identifies users that are the “cheapest” to purchase. To ensure truthfulness,
it compensates them within budget based on the unit-cost of the last individual
that was not included in the set of compensated users. As in greedy solutions to
knapsack, this construction does not necessarily yield a constant approximation
w.r.t. OPT; for that, the mechanism needs to sometimes compensate only the
user with the highest absolute weight |wi|. In such cases, the payment of the
user of the highest weight is selected so that she has no incentive to lie about
here true unit cost.
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Algorithm 1 FairInnerProduct(v,w, B)
Let k be the largest integer such that B
w([k])
≥ vk
W−w([k])
.
Let i∗ := argmax
i∈[n] |wi|.
Let pˆ be as defined in (9).
if |wi∗ | >
∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} |wi| then
Set O = {i∗}.
Set pi∗ = pˆ and pi = 0 for all i 6= i
∗.
else
Set O = [k].
Pay each i ∈ O, pi = |wi|min{
B
w([k])
,
vk+1
W−w([k])
}, and for i /∈ O, pi = 0.
end if
Set xi = 1 if i ∈ O and xi = 0 otherwise.
Recall that v1 ≤ . . . ≤ vn. The mechanism defines i∗ := argmaxi∈[n] |wi|
as the individual with the largest |wi|, and k as the largest integer such that
B
w([k]) ≥
vk
W−w([k]) . Subsequently, the mechanism either sets xi = 1 for the first
k individuals, or, if |wi∗ | >
∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} |wi|, sets xi∗ = 1. In the former case,
individuals i ∈ [k] are compensated in proportion to their absolute weights |wi|.
If, on the other hand, only xi∗ = 1, the individual i
∗ receives a payment pˆ defined
as follows: Let
S−i∗ :=
{
t∈ [n]\{i∗} :
B∑
i∈[t]\{i∗}|wi|
≥
vt
W −
∑
i∈[t]\{i∗}|wi|
and
∑
i∈[t]\{i∗}
|wi| ≥ |wi∗ |
}
.
If S−i∗ 6= ∅, then let r := min{i : i ∈ S−i∗}. Define
pˆ :=
{
B, if S−i∗ = ∅
|wi∗ |vr
W−|wi∗ | , otherwise
(9)
The next theorem states that FairInnerProduct has the properties we desire.
Theorem 3 FairInnerProduct is truthful, individually rational and budget fea-
sible. It is 5-approximate with respect to OPT . Further, it is 2-approximate when
all weights are equal.
The theorem is proved in Appendix D. We note that the truthfulness of the knap-
sack mechanism in [12] is established via Myerson’s characterization of truthful
single-parameter auctions (i.e., by showing that the allocation is monotone and
the payments are threshold). In contrast, because of the coupling of costs induced
by the Laplace noise in DCLEFs, we are unable to use Myerson’s characterization
and, instead, give a direct argument about truthfulness.
We prove a 5-approximation by using the optimal solution of the fractional
relaxation of (7). This technique can also be used to show that the knapsack
mechanism in [12] is 5-approximate instead of 6-approximate. FairInnerProduct
generalizes the Ghosh-Roth mechanism; in the special case when all weights are
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equal FairInnerProduct reduces to the Ghosh-Roth mechanism, which, by Theo-
rem 3, is 2-approximate with respect to OPT . In fact, our next theorem, proved
in Appendix E, states that the approximation ratio of a truthful mechanism is
lower-bounded by 2.
Theorem 4 (Hardness of Approximation) For all ε > 0, there is no truth-
ful, individually rational, budget feasible DCLEF mechanism that is also 2 − ε-
approximate with respect to OPT .
Our benchmark OPT is stricter than that used in [7]. In particular, Ghosh and
Roth show that their mechanism is optimal among all truthful, individually
rational, budget-feasible, and envy-free mechanisms. In fact, the example we use
to show hardness of approximation is a uniform weight example, implying that
the lower-bound also holds for uniform weight case. Indeed, the mechanism in [7]
is 2-approximate with respect to OPT , although it is optimal among individually
rational, budget feasible mechanisms that are also truthful and envy free.
5 Discussion on Linear Predictors
As discussed in the introduction, a statistic s(d) of the form (1) can be viewed as
a linear predictor and is thus of particular interest in the context of recommender
systems. We elaborate on this interpretation in this section. Assume that each
individual i ∈ [n] = {1, . . . , n} is endowed with a public vector yi ∈ Rm, which
includes m publicly known features about this individual. These could be, for
example, demographic information such as age, gender or zip code, that the
individual discloses in a public online profile. Note that, though features yi are
public, the data di is perceived as private.
Let Y = [yi]i∈[n] ∈ Rn×m be a matrix comprising public feature vectors.
Consider a new individual, not belonging to the database, whose public feature
profile is y ∈ Rm. Having access to Y, d, and y, the data analyst wishes to
release a prediction for the unknown value d for this new individual. Below, we
give several examples where this prediction takes the form s(d) = 〈w,d〉, for
some w = w(y,Y). All examples are textbook inference examples; we refer the
interested reader to, for example, [22] for details.
k-Nearest Neighbors. In k-Nearest Neighbors prediction, the feature space
R
m is endowed with a distance metric (e.g., the ℓ2 norm), and the predicted
value is given by an average among the k nearest neighbors of the feature vector
y of the new individual. I.e., s(d) = 1k
∑
i∈Nk(y) di where Nk(y) ⊂ [n] comprises
the k individuals whose feature vectors yi are closest to y.
Nadaranya-Watson Weighted Average. The Nadaranya-Watson weighted av-
erage leverages all data in the database, weighing more highly data closer to y.
The general form of the prediction is 5s(d) =
∑n
i=1K(y,yi)di/
∑n
i=1K(y,yi)
where the kernel K : Rm × Rm → R+ is a function decreasing in the distance
between its argument (e.g., K(y,y′) = e−‖y−y
′‖2).
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Ridge Regression. In ridge regression, the analyst first fits a linear model to
the data, i.e., solves the optimization problem
minb∈Rm
∑n
i=1
(
di − 〈yi,b〉
)2
+ λ‖b‖22, (10)
where λ ≥ 0 is a regularization parameter, enforcing that the vector b takes small
values. The prediction is then given by the inner product 〈y,b〉. The solution to
(10) is given by b = (YTY+ λI)−1YTd; as such, the predicted value for a new
user with feature vector y is given by s(d) = 〈y,b〉 = yT (YTY + λI)−1YTd.
Support Vector Machines. A more general regression model assumes that the
private values di can be expressed in terms of the public vectors yi as a linear
combination of a set of basis functions hℓ : R
m → R, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, i.e., the
analyst first solves the optimization problem
minb∈RL
∑n
i=1
(
di −
∑L
ℓ=1 bℓhℓ(yi)
)2
+ λ‖b‖22 (11)
For y,y′ ∈ Rm, denote by K(y,y′) =
∑L
ℓ=1 hℓ(y)hℓ(y) the kernel of the space
spanned by the basis functions. Let K(Y) = [K(yi,yj)]i,j∈[n] ∈ Rn×n be the
n×nmatrix comprising the kernel values evaluated at each pair of feature vectors
in the database, and k(y,Y) = [K(y,yi)]i∈[n] ∈ Rn the kernel values w.r.t. the
new user. The solution to (11) yields a predicted value for the new individual of
the form: s(d) = (k(y,Y))T (K(Y ) + λI)−1d.
In all four examples, the prediction s(d) is indeed of the form (1). Note that
the weights are non-negative in the first two examples, but may assume negative
values in the latter two.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We considered the setting of an auction, where a data analyst wishes to buy,
from a set of n individuals, the right to use their private data di ∈ R, i ∈ [n],
in order to cheaply obtain an accurate estimate of a statistic. Motivated by
recommender systems and, more generally, prediction problems, the statistic we
consider is a linear predictor with publicly known weights. The statistic can be
viewed as a prediction of the unknown data of a new individual based on the
database entries. We formalized the trade-off between privacy and accuracy in
this setting; we showed that obtaining an accurate estimate necessitates giving
poor differential privacy guarantees to individuals whose cumulative weight is
large. We showed that DCLEF estimators achieve an order-optimal trade-off
between privacy and accuracy, and, consequently, it suffices to focus on DCLEF
mechanisms. We use this observation to design a truthful, individually rational,
budget feasible mechanism under the constraint that the analyst has a fixed
budget. Our mechanism can be viewed as a proportional-purchase mechanism,
i.e., the privacy ǫi guaranteed by the mechanism to individual i is proportional
to her weight |wi|. We show that our mechanism is 5-approximate in terms of
accuracy compared to an optimal (possibly non-truthful) mechanism, and that
no truthful mechanism can achieve a 2− ε approximation, for any ε > 0.
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Our work is the first studying privacy auctions for asymmetric statistics, and
can be extended in a number of directions. An interesting direction to investigate
is characterizing the most general class of statistics for which truthful privacy
auctions that achieve order-optimal accuracy can be designed. An orthogonal
direction is to study the release of asymmetric statistics in other settings such
as (a) using a different notion of privacy, (b) allowing costs to be correlated
with the data values, and (c) survey-type settings where individuals first decide
whether to participate and then reveal their private data.
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A Proof of Theorem 1 (Trade-off between Privacy-index
and Distortion)
By Definition 3, the privacy index β(sˆ) for an estimator sˆ is the optimal objec-
tive value of the following optimization problem: maximize
∑n
i=1 |wi|xi where∑n
i=1 ǫixi <
1
2 and for all i ∈ [n], xi ∈ {0, 1}.
Interpreting |wi| as the value, and ǫi as the size of object i, the above prob-
lem can be viewed as a 0/1 knapsack problem where the size of the knap-
sack is 1/2. Assume for this proof, without loss of generality, that ǫ1|w1| ≤
. . . ≤ ǫn|wn| . We define some notation that is needed in the proof. Let h(sˆ) :=
max
{
j ∈ [n] : ǫj|wj | <
1
2w([j])
}
if ǫ1|w1| <
1
2|w1| and h(sˆ) := 0 otherwise. Observe
that 0 ≤ h(sˆ) ≤ n. Next, define
iˆ := argmax
i∈[n]:ǫi<1/2
|wi|, and H(sˆ) :=
{
[h(sˆ)], if w([h(sˆ)]) ≥ |wiˆ|,
{iˆ}, otherwise.
The following then holds.
Lemma 3 2w(H(sˆ)) ≥ β(sˆ).
Proof. H(sˆ) is a 2-approximate greedy solution to the 0/1 knapsack problem
given by [23, Section 2.4].
Now we are ready to prove that if the distortion δ(s, sˆ) is small, then w(H(sˆ))
is also small, which, together with Lemma 3, proves the theorem. In our proof, we
make use of the notion of k-accuracy defined in [7, Definition 2.6]. For sˆ : In → R,
let
ksˆ := min
{
k ∈ R+ : ∀d ∈ I
n,P[|s(d)− sˆ(d)| ≥ k] ≤
1
3
}
(12)
Lemma 4 Let 0 < α < 1. If w(H(sˆ)) > αW then ksˆ > αW∆/4.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that w(H(sˆ)) > αW and ksˆ ≤
αW∆/4. For a data vector d, let z = s(d) =
∑
i widi and zˆ = sˆ(d). Also, let
S := {y ∈ R : |y − z| < ksˆ}. Then, by (12), P[zˆ ∈ S] ≥ 2/3.
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The set H(sˆ) can be partitioned as follows: H(sˆ) = H+(sˆ) ∪ H−(sˆ), with
H+(sˆ)∩H−(sˆ) = {∅}, where the disjoint subsets H+(sˆ) and H−(sˆ) are defined
by
H+(sˆ) = {i ∈ [n] : di ≤ R¯ and wi ≤ 0} ∪ {i ∈ [n] : di > R¯ and wi > 0},
H−(sˆ) = {i ∈ [n] : di ≤ R¯ and wi > 0} ∪ {i ∈ [n] : di > R¯ and wi ≤ 0}.
(13)
Then w(H(sˆ)) = w(H+(sˆ)) + w(H−(sˆ)). Thus, one of the subsets H+(sˆ) and
H−(sˆ) must have a total weight greater or equal to w(H(sˆ))/2. Without loss of
generality, assume that w(H+(sˆ)) ≥ w(H(sˆ))/2.
Consider another data vector d′ where d′i = di if i ∈ [n] \ H
+(sˆ), while if
i ∈ H+(sˆ),
d′i =
{
di +
∆
2 , if di ≤ R¯ and wi ≤ 0
di −
∆
2 , if di > R¯ and wi > 0
(14)
Let z′ := s(d′) =
∑n
i=1 wid
′
i and let zˆ
′ = sˆ(d′). Also, let S′ := {y ∈ R : |y−z′| <
ksˆ}. From eq. (14), we have
|z − z′|=
∣∣ ∑
i∈H+(sˆ)
wi(di − d
′
i)
∣∣= ∣∣ ∑
i∈H+(sˆ)
|wi|∆/2
∣∣=∆
2
w(H+(sˆ)) ≥
∆
4
w(H(sˆ)) > α
∆
4
W.
(15)
Since ksˆ ≤ αW∆/4, eq. (15) implies that S and S′ are disjoint.
Since sˆ is (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-differentially private, and d and d
′ differ in exactly the
entries inH+(sˆ), P[zˆ′ ∈ S] ≥ exp
(
−
∑
i∈H+(sˆ) ǫi
)
P[zˆ ∈ S] ≥ exp
(
−
∑
i∈H+(sˆ) ǫi
)
2
3 .
Note that
∑
i∈[h(sˆ)] ǫi <
∑
i∈[h(sˆ)]
|wi|
2w([h(sˆ)]) =
1
2 , and also ǫiˆ < 1/2. Therefore,∑
i∈H(sˆ) ǫi < 1/2. Since H
+(sˆ) ⊂ H(sˆ), we have
∑
i∈H+(sˆ) ǫi ≤
∑
i∈H(sˆ) ǫi <
1/2.
This implies P[zˆ′ ∈ S] ≥ exp
(
−
∑
i∈H+(sˆ) ǫi
)
2
3 > exp
(
− 12
)
2
3 =
2
3
√
e
> 13 .
Given that S and S′ are disjoint, P[zˆ′ ∈ S] > 1/3 implies that P[zˆ′ /∈ S′] > 1/3,
which contradicts the assumption that ksˆ ≤ αW∆/4.
Next we relate ksˆ-accuracy to the distortion δ(s, sˆ):
Lemma 5 For s(d) as defined in (1) and a function sˆ : In → R, ksˆ ≤
√
3δ(s, sˆ).
Proof. Observe that for all k ≥
√
3δ(s, sˆ), P[|s(d)−sˆ(d)| ≥ k] ≤ P[|s(d)−sˆ(d)| ≥√
3δ(s, sˆ)] ≤ E[|s(d)−sˆ(d)|
2]
3δ(s,sˆ) ≤
1
3 where the second step follows from Markov’s
inequality. This implies ksˆ ≤
√
3δ(s, sˆ).
Corollary 2 If w(H(sˆ)) > αW then δ(s, sˆ) > (αW∆)2/48.
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Thus from Corollary 2, we have that if δ(s, sˆ) ≤ (αW∆)2/48, then w(H(sˆ)) ≤
αW . Since w(H(sˆ)) ≥ 12β(sˆ) (from Lemma 3), it implies if δ(s, sˆ) ≤ (αW∆)
2/48,
then 12β(sˆ) ≤ αW . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
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B Proof of Lemma 2
For the first part of this lemma, observe that the sensitivity of
∑
i wi[xidi+(1−
xi)ai] w.r.t. i is Si(sˆ) = ∆|wi|xi. The differential privacy guarantee therefore
follows from Lemma 1.
To obtain the lower bound on the distortion, observe that substituting the
expressions for s and sˆ in the expression for δ(s, sˆ), we get
δ(s, sˆ) = max
d∈In
E[|s(d) − sˆ(d; a,x, σ)|2]
= max
d∈In
E
[( n∑
i=1
widi(1− xi)−
n∑
i=1
wiai(1 − xi)− z
)2]
(where z ∼ Lap(σ))
= max
d∈In
( n∑
i=1
wi(1− xi)(di − ai)
)2
+ 2σ2 (since E[z] = 0;E[z2] = 2σ2)
= 2σ2 +max
d∈In
( n∑
i=1
γi(di − ai)
)2
= 2σ2 +
(
max
d∈In
∣∣ n∑
i=1
γi(di − ai)
∣∣)2
Observe that maxd∈In |f(d)| = max
{∣∣maxd∈In f(d)∣∣, ∣∣mind∈In f(d)∣∣} for any
continuous function f : In → R. Therefore,
δ(s, sˆ) = 2σ2 +
(
max
{∣∣max
d∈In
n∑
i=1
γi(di − ai)
∣∣, ∣∣min
d∈In
n∑
i=1
γi(di − ai)
∣∣})2
= 2σ2 +
(
max
{∣∣γ(+)Rmax + γ(−)Rmin − n∑
i=1
γiai
∣∣, ∣∣γ(+)Rmin + γ(−)Rmax − n∑
i=1
γiai
∣∣})2,
where γ(+) :=
∑n
i:γi≥0 γi, and γ
(−) :=
∑n
i:γi<0
γi. Observe that, for any a, b, c,∈
R, it is true that max(|a− c|, |b− c|) ≥ |a−b|2 with equality attained at c =
a+b
2 .
Applying this for a = γ(+)Rmax + γ
(−)Rmin, b = γ(+)Rmin + γ(−)Rmax and
c =
∑n
i=1 γiai we get mina∈Rn δ(s, sˆ) ≥ 2σ
2 + (γ
+−γ−)(Rmax−Rmin)
2 = 2σ
2 +(
∆
2
∑n
i=1 |wi|(1−xi)
)2
, with equality attained when
∑
i γiai = (γ
+ + γ−)(Rmax +Rmin)/2 =∑
i γiR¯, which holds for ai = R¯.
C Proof of Theorem 2 (DCLEFs Suffice)
Consider the function sˆ◦(d) :=
∑
i/∈H◦ widi+ R¯
∑
i∈H◦ wi+Lap(w(H
◦)), where
H◦ is defined as H◦ := argmax{w(H) : H ⊆ [n] and w(H) ≤ αW} . We can
write sˆ◦ as sˆ◦(d;x) :=
∑n
i=1 widixi + R¯
∑n
i=1 wi(1 − xi) + Lap(w(H
◦)), where
xi = 0 for all i ∈ H◦ and xi = 1 otherwise. Observe that sˆ◦ is a DCLEF and
δ(s, sˆ◦) Lem. 2= 94∆
2 (
∑n
i=1 |wi|(1− xi))
2
= 94∆
2 (w(H◦))2 ≤ 94 (αW∆)
2. Since
δ(s, sˆ∗) ≤ (αW∆)2/48, it follows from Lemma 5 that ksˆ∗ ≤ αW∆/4. Then, it
follows from Lemma 4 that w(H(sˆ∗)) ≤ αW , where H(sˆ∗) is as defined in the
proof of Theorem 1. Further, it follows that w(H◦) ≥ w(H(sˆ∗)) ≥ 12β(sˆ
∗) (the
first inequality follows by definition ofH◦ and the fact that w(H(sˆ∗)) ≤ αW , and
the second from Lemma 3). Since β(sˆ◦) ≥ w(H◦), it follows that β(sˆ◦) ≥ 12β(sˆ
∗).
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D Proof of Theorem 3
D.1 Truthfulness, Individual Rationality, and Budget Feasibility
In this section, we prove that FairInnerProduct is truthful, individually rational,
and budget feasible. We first define
S1 :=
{
t ∈ [n] \ {i∗} :
B∑
i∈[t]\{i∗} |wi|
≥
vt
W −
∑
i∈[t]\{i∗} |wi|
}
and
S2 :=

t ∈ [n] \ {i∗} :
∑
i∈[t]\{i∗}
|wi| ≥ |wi∗ |

 .
Observe that S−i∗ = S1 ∩ S2.
Proposition 1 FairInnerProduct is budget feasible.
Proof. When O = {i∗} and pˆ = B, the mechanism is trivially budget feasible. If
pˆ = |wi∗ |vrW−|wi∗ | then observe that since r ∈ S−i∗ , this implies r ∈ S1 and r ∈ S2.
Therefore, pˆ = |wi∗ |vrW−|wi∗ | ≤
|wi∗ |vr
W−∑i∈[r]\{i∗} |wi| ≤
|wi∗ |B∑
i∈[r]\{i∗} |wi| ≤ B where the
second inequality holds because r ∈ S1 and the last inequality because r ∈ S2.
When O = [k], the sum of the payments made by the mechanism is given by∑
i≤k pi ≤
∑
i≤k |wi|
B
w([k]) =
B
w([k])
∑
i≤k |wi| = B.
Proposition 2 If i∗ > k + 1 and |wi∗ | >
∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} |wi|, then S−i∗ = ∅.
Proof. Observe that if i∗ > k+1 and |wi∗ | >
∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} |wi|, then S1 = [k] and
S2 ∩ [k] = ∅.
Proposition 3 If |wi∗ | >
∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} |wi| and S−i∗ 6= ∅, then r > i
∗.
Proof. From Proposition 2, S−i∗ 6= ∅ implies either i∗ ≤ k + 1 or |wi∗ | ≤∑
i∈[k]\{i∗} wi. Since the latter is false, it must be that i
∗ ≤ k + 1. In that
case, S2 ∩ [k] = ∅. Therefore r > k. If i∗ = k + 1, then for all j ∈ S2, j ≥ k + 2.
Therefore r ≥ k + 2.
Proposition 4 FairInnerProduct is individually rational.
Proof. We divide the proof into two cases:
Case I: O = [k]. We know that B/w([k]) ≥ vk/(W − w([k])) (by construc-
tion) and vk+1 ≥ vk (by definition). Therefore, for all i ≤ k, pi ≥
|wi|vk
W−w([k]) ≥
|wi|vi
W−w([k]) = ci(ǫi).
Case II: O = {i∗}. If pi∗ = B, then the mechanism is individually rational by
Assumption 5. If pi∗ =
|wi∗ |vr
W−|wi∗ | , then, by Proposition 3, vr ≥ vi∗ and therefore
the mechanism is individually rational. ⊓⊔
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Proposition 5 FairInnerProduct is dominant-strategy truthful.
Proof. Fix any v and assume that user i reports a value z 6= vi, while the
remaining values v−i remain the same. Let u be the resulting vector of values,
i.e., ui = z and uj = vj , for j 6= i. The vector u induces a new ordering of
the users in terms of their reported values ui, i ∈ [n]; let π : [n] → [n] be the
permutation indicating the position of users under the new ordering. That is,
π is 1-1 and onto such that if uj < uj′ then π(j) < π(j
′), for all j, j′ ∈ [n].
For given j ∈ [n], we denote the set of users preceding j under this ordering by
Pj = {j′ : π(j′) ≤ π(j)}. Note that al j′ ∈ Pj satisfy u′j ≤ uj. Observe that if
z > vi then
w(Pj) =


w([j]), for all j < i
w([j]) − |wi|, for all j > i s.t. π(j) < π(i)
w([i]) + w({ℓ : ℓ > i ∧ π(ℓ) < π(i)}), for j = i
w([i]), for allj > i s.t. π(j) > π(i)
(16)
while if z < vi then
w(Pj) =


w([j]), for all j < i s.t. π(j) < π(i)
w([i]) − w({ℓ : ℓ < i ∧ π(ℓ) > π(i)}), for j = i
w([j]) + |wi|, for all j < i s.t. π(j) > π(i)
w([i]), for all j > i
(17)
Let Mπ =
{
j ∈ [n] : Bw(Pj) ≥
uj
W−w(Pj)
}
where W = w([n]). Then, by (16), if
z > vi then w(Pj) ≤ w([j]) for j 6= i while w(Pi) ≥ w([i]). As a result, if z > vi,
then
for j 6= i, if j ∈ [k], then j ∈Mπ (18a)
if i /∈ [k], then i /∈Mπ (18b)
Similarly, from (17), if z < vi, then
for j 6= i, if j /∈ [k], then j /∈Mπ (19a)
if i ∈ [k], then i ∈Mπ (19b)
Observe that, given the value vector u, the mechanism will output Oπ = {i
∗},
if |w∗i | > w(Mπ \ {i
∗}), and Oπ = Mπ otherwise. If Oπ =Mπ, users j ∈Mπ are
compensated by pj = wj min
{
B
w(Mπ)
,
minℓ:ℓ/∈Mπ uℓ
W−w(Mπ)
}
. If Oπ = {i
∗}, the latter is
compensated by pˆ given by (9). We consider the following cases:
Case I: Oπ = Mπ. If i /∈ Mπ, then pi = ǫi = 0, so since FairInnerProduct is
individually rational, i has no incentive to report z. Suppose thus that i ∈Mπ.
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We consider the following subcases:
Case I(a): i /∈ [k]. Then vi ≥ vk+1. Since i ∈ Mπ but i /∈ [k], (18) implies that
z < vi. By (19) k + 1 /∈Mπ. Thus pi ≤ |wi|vk+1/w(Mπ) ≤ |wi|vi/w(Mπ).
Case I(b): i ∈ [k]. We will first show that Mπ \ [k] = ∅. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, thatMπ \ [k] 6= ∅. ThenMπ \ [k] must contain an element different
than i; this, along with (19) implies that z > vi. If π(i) < π(k+1), then by (16)
w(Pj) = w([j]) and j /∈Mπ for all j ≥ k + 1, which contradicts that Mπ \ [k] is
non-empty. Hence, π(i) > π(k+1); this however implies that w(Pi) ≥ w([k+1]),
by (16), and that z ≥ vk+1. Thus
B
w(Pi)
≤ Bw([k+1]) <
vk+1
W−w([k+1]) ≤
z
W−w(Pi) , so
i /∈Mπ, a contradiction. Hence Mπ \ [k] = ∅.
Next we will show that the original output O = [k]. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, that O = {i∗}. Then |wi∗ | > w([k] \ {i∗}) while |wi∗ | ≤ w(Mπ \
{i∗}). Thus, Mπ \ [k] 6= ∅, a contradiction. Thus, O = [k].
If Oπ = Mπ = [k], then since O = [k], user i receives the same payoff, so
it has no incentive to report z. Suppose that Mπ 6= [k]. Since Mπ \ [k] = ∅, it
must be that [k] \Mπ 6= ∅. By (18), this implies z < vi. If i < k, (17) implies
that k ∈ Mπ and so do all j s.t. π(j) < π(k). Thus, [k] = Mπ, a contradiction.
If i = k and z < vi, then it is possible that j /∈ Mπ for some j < k. Thus,
pi ≤
|wi|vk
w(Mπ)
= |wi|viw(Mπ) and so i has no incentive to report z.
Case II. Oπ = {i∗}. If i 6= i∗, then i’s payoff is obviously zero, so it has no
incentive to report z. Suppose thus that i = i∗. We consider the following two
subcases.
Case II(a). O = {i∗}. Observe that S−i∗ and pˆ do not depend on vi∗ . Thus,
since O = {i∗}, i receives the same payment pˆ, so it has no incentive to misreport
its value.
Case II(b) O = [k]. Then |wi∗ | ≤ w([k] \ {i∗}) while |wi∗ | > w(Mπ \ {i∗}).
Thus, [k]\Mπ must contain an element different than i∗. From (18), this implies
that z < vi. If i < k, (17) implies that k ∈ Mπ and so do all j s.t. π(j) < π(k).
Thus, [k] = Mπ, a contradiction.
Assume thus that i ≥ k. Then vi ≥ vk. Let j∗ = k if i > k and j∗ = k − 1 if
i = k. Observe that j∗ ∈ S−i∗ : indeed, it is in S1 since i ∈ [k], by the definition
of k, and it is in S2 because |wi∗ | ≤ w([k]\ {i∗}). Hence pˆ ≤
|wi|vj∗
W−|wi| ≤
wivk
W−|wi| ≤
|wi|vi
W−|wi| so i’s payoff is at most zero, so it has no incentive to misreport its value.
D.2 Approximation Ratio
In this section we prove that FairInnerProduct is 5-approximate with respect to
OPT .
Optimal Continuous Canonical Laplace Mechanism We first characterize
an individually rational, budget feasible, continuous canonical Laplace mecha-
nism that has optimal distortion. Consider the fractional relaxation of (7).
maximize
n∑
i=1
|wi|xi (20a)
20
subject to pi ≥ ci(ǫi) = viǫi(x), ∀i ∈ [n] (20b)
n∑
i=1
pi ≤ B (20c)
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n] (20d)
where ǫi(x) =
|wi|xi∑
i |wi|(1−xi) . A budget feasible, individually rational, (but not
necessarily discrete or truthful) canonical Laplace mechanism for the inner pro-
duct has a minimal distortion among all such mechanisms if given input (v,w, B)
it outputs (x∗,p∗), where the latter constitute an optimal solution to the above
problem. This characterization will yield the approximation guarantee of the
DCLEF mechanism1.
Lemma 6 Recall that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vn. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n, define p(k) :=∑n
i=k+1 |wi|, if 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, and p(n) := 0. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n, define q(0) := 0, and
q(k) :=
∑k
i=1 vi|wi|, if 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Define ℓ := min {k : ∀i > k, q(i)−Bp(i) > 0}
and let
x∗i :=


1, if i ≤ ℓ
Bp(ℓ)−q(ℓ)
(vℓ+1+B)|wℓ+1| , if i = ℓ+ 1
0, if i > ℓ+ 1
, and p∗i = vi|wi|x
∗
i /σ(x
∗) i ∈ [n].
Then (x∗,p∗) is an optimal solution to (20).
Proof. We show first that the quantities ℓ and x∗i are well defined. For p(i),
q(i), i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, as defined in the statement of the theorem, observe that
g(i) = q(i) − Bp(i) is strictly increasing and that g(0) < 0 while g(n) > 0.
Hence, ℓ is well defined; in particular, ℓ ≤ n− 1. The monotonicity of g implies
that g(i) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and g(i) > 0 for i > ℓ. For a ∈ [0, 1], let
h(a) = q(ℓ) + vℓ+1|wℓ+1|a − B(p(ℓ + 1) + |wℓ+1|(1 − a)). Then h(0) = g(ℓ) ≤ 0
and h(1) = g(ℓ + 1) > 0. As h(a) is continuous and strictly increasing in the
reals, there exists a unique a∗ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. h(a) = 0; since h is linear, it is easy to
verify that a∗ = q(ℓ) − Bp(ℓ)/(vℓ + B)|wℓ+1| = x∗ℓ+1 and, hence, x
∗
ℓ+1 ∈ [0, 1].
To solve (20), we need only consider cases for which constraint (20b) is tight,
i.e., pi = viǫi(x). Any solution for which (20b) is not tight can be converted to
a solution where it is; this will only strengthen constraint (20c), and will not
affect the objective. Thus, (20) is equivalent to:
Max. F (x) =
n∑
i=1
|wi|xi (21a)
subj. to
n∑
i=1
vi|wi|xi −B
n∑
i=1
wi(1− xi) ≤ 0, x ∈ [0, 1]
n (21b)
1 An analogous characterization of the budget-limited knapsack mechanism in [12] can
be used to show that the mechanism is 5-approximate instead of 6-approximate.
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It thus suffices to show that x∗ is an optimal solution to (21). The latter is
a linear program and its Lagrangian is
L(x, λ, µ, ν) = −F (x)+λ
( n∑
i=1
vi|wi|xi−B
n∑
i=1
|wi|(1−xi)
)
+
n∑
i=1
µi(xi−1)−
n∑
i=1
νixi.
It is easy to verify that x∗ satisfies the KKT conditions of (21) with λ∗ = 1vℓ+1+B ,
µ∗i = 1(i≤ℓ) ·
vℓ+1−vi
vℓ+1+B
|wi|, and ν∗i = 1(i>ℓ+1) ·
vi−vℓ+1
vℓ+1+B
|wi|.
A canonical Laplace mechanism that outputs (x∗,p∗) given by Lemma 6
would be optimal. Moreover, the objective value S(x∗;w) ≥ OPT .
Proposition 6 Let ℓ be as is defined in Lemma 6, and k as defined in FairIn-
nerProduct. Then, ℓ ≥ k.
Proof. Assume that ℓ < k. Then
B(W−w([k])) ≤ B(W−w([ℓ+1])) <
ℓ+1∑
i=1
|wi|vi ≤
k∑
i=1
|wi|vi ≤ vk
∑
i≤k
wi = vkw([k]).
However, this contradicts the fact that B/w(k) ≥ vk/(W − w([k])).
Proposition 7 Let {x∗i } and ℓ be as defined in Lemma 6, and k as defined in
FairInnerProduct. Then, w([k + 1]) >
∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i .
Proof. If ℓ = k, the statement is trivially true. Consider thus the case ℓ > k.
Assume that
∑k+1
i=1 wi ≤
∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i . Then,
B(W − w([k + 1]))
w([k + 1])
≥
B(W −
∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i )∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i
≥
B(W −
∑ℓ+1
i=1 |wi|x
∗
i )∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i
≥
∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|vix
∗
i∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i
≥ vk+1
since vk+1 ≤ vi for all (k + 1) ≤ i ≤ ℓ. However, this contradicts the fact that
B/w([k + 1]) < vk+1/(W − w([k + 1])).
Now we will show that S(x;w) ≥ 15OPT using Proposition 7. First notice
that since (20) is a relaxation of (7), OPT ≤ S(x∗;w), where {x∗i } are de-
fined in Lemma 6. Therefore, we have that OPT ≤ S(x∗;w) =
∑
i≤k |wi| +∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i
Prop. 7
< w([k]) + w([k + 1]) ≤ 2w([k]) + |wi∗ | It follows that if
O = [k], it implies w([k]) ≥ |wi∗ | and therefore w([k]) = S(x;w) ≥
1
3OPT .
On the other hand, if O = {i∗}, then |wi∗ | >
∑
j∈[k+1]\{i∗} |wj |, which implies
2wi∗ > w([k]). Therefore, OPT ≤ 2w([k]) + |wi∗ | < 5|wi∗ | = 5S(x;w).
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D.3 The Uniform-Weight Case
In this section, we prove that when all weights are equal, FairInnerProduct is
2-approximate with respect to OPT .
Let |wi| = u for all i ∈ [n]. First, observe that in this case, FairInnerProduct
always outputs O = [k]. Therefore, S(x;w) = ku. We use this observation to
prove the result.
Lemma 7 Assume that for all i ∈ [n], |wi| = u. Then, S(x;w) ≥
1
2OPT .
Proof. Observe thatOPT ≤ S(x∗;w) =
∑ℓ+1
i=1 |wi|x
∗
i = w([k])+
∑ℓ+1
i=k+1 |wi|x
∗
i <
w([k])+w([k+1]) from Proposition 7, where {x∗i } and ℓ are defined in Lemma 6.
Substituting |wi| = u for all i, we get OPT < (2k + 1)u Since OPT is the ob-
jective value attained by the optimal DCLEF mechanism, OPT = mu for some
m ∈ [n]. This implies 2k + 1 > m. Since k and m are integers, it follows that
2k ≥ m, or equivalently, S(x;w) ≥ 12OPT .
E Proof of Theorem 4 (Hardness of Approximation)
Consider the following example. Let n = 4. The private costs of the four indi-
viduals are given by v1 = a, v2 = v3 = v4 = 2, where 0 < a < 2. The weights of
the four individuals are given by w1 = w2 = w3 = w = d, where d > 0. Let the
budget B = 1 + a/2 < 2.
Observe that the optimal individually rational, budget-feasible, DCLEF mech-
anism would set x∗1 = 1 and exactly one of x∗2, x∗3 and x∗4 to 1. Without loss of
generality, assume that x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1 and x
∗
3 = x
∗
4 = 0. Therefore, the optimal
weight OPT = 2d. Consider a truthful DCLEF mechanism that is 2− ε approx-
imate, for any ε > 0. Such a mechanism must set x1 = 1 (since it is truthful)
and at least one more xi to 1 (since it is 2− ε approximate). Therefore, for such
a mechanism σ(x) ≤ 2d. This implies that for such a mechanism, the cost of
individual 1, c1(ǫ1) = v1w1/σ(x) ≥ v1d/(2d) ≥ v1/2. Since the mechanism is
truthful, the payment p1 cannot depend on v1. Also, for this mechanism to be
individually rational, p1 must be at least 1 (since v1 can be arbitrarily close to
2), which implies that the remaining budget is strictly less than 1. However, for
this mechanism, for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, ci(ǫi) = 2d/σ(x) ≥ 1. This means that this
mechanism cannot be both individually rational and budget feasible. ⊓⊔
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